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The hearsay rule "rests on a simple, commonsensical idea: if you are
trying to find out what happened, it is best to hear directly from someone
who was there. Call it the principle of the horse's mouth."1 This seemingly
simple concept has grown into a rather complicated legal thicket. This es-
say will address one part of the hearsay thicket: implied assertions.
Conduct not intended to be an assertion is commonly labeled an "im-
plied assertion."2 What exactly does this mean? Two examples are illustra-
tive: (1) a person opening an umbrella as evidence of rain and (2) a driver
moving forward from a stopped position as evidence that the traffic light
changed from red to green.
3
The fires of controversy were stoked for years in this area of law, with
scholars debating whether implied assertions should be classified as hear-
say, non-hearsay, or a hearsay exception.4 Under the common law, as crys-
tallized in the seminal case Wright v. Tatham,5 implied assertions were
classified as hearsay. Fuel was thrown onto the scholarly fire when the
Federal Rules of Evidence came down on one side of the issue, defining
* Attorney, Helmerich & Payne, Inc. This article is dedicated to my beloved wife, Lauren
Miller.
1. David Alan Sklansky, Hearsay's Last Hurrah, 2009 Sup. CT. REV. 1, 11 (2009).
2. The term "implied assertion" is misleading. See Christopher B. Mueller, Post-Modern Hear-
say Reform: The Importance of Complexity, 76 MINN. L. REV. 367, 418 n.153 (1992) ("But 'implied
assertion' is a singularly inept and artificial umbrella term. It requires us to understand 'imply' in the
weak sense of 'suggest' to 'indicate,' not in the usual strong sense of describing what a person means to
convey. It divorces 'assertion' from normal usage, making it mean essentially 'evidence' and severing it
from expressive or communicative purpose."); Roger C. Park, "I Didn't Tell Them Anything About
You": Implied Assertions as Hearsay Under the Federal Rules of Evidence, 74 MiNN. L. REV. 783, 788
(1990) ("The term 'implied assertion' has become a term of art for hearsay writers, who tend to give it a
meaning somewhat broader than that which it may connote to many readers. To say an utterance is
offered as an 'implied assertion' is not to say that the declarant intended to insinuate the fact the
proponent is trying to prove. It merely means the trier is being asked to infer that fact from the declar-
ant's utterance.").
3. See Judson F. Falknor, The Hearsay Rule as a "See-Do" Rule: Evidence of Conduct, 33
ROCKY MTN. L. REV. 133 (1961).
4. See id.; Ted Finman, Implied Assertions as Hearsay: Some Criticisms of the Uniform Rules of
Evidence, 14 STAN. L. REV. 682 (1962); Charles T. McCormick, The Borderland of Hearsay, 39 YALE
L.J. 489 (1930); Edmund M. Morgan, Hearsay Dangers and the Application of the Hearsay Concept, 62
HARV. L. REV. 177 (1948).
5. Wright v. Doe d. Tatham, 112 Eng. Rep. 488 (Exch. Ch. 1837), affd, 7 Eng. Rep. 559 (H.L.
1838).
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implied assertions as non-hearsay.6 This was a dramatic shift from the
common law approach, as embodied in Wright v. Tatham.7
It must be noted that hearsay scholars have been much more focused
on the implied assertion problem than judges.8 In fact, the courts rarely
address the issue of "whether implied assertions are hearsay, whether the
doctrine of Wright v. Tatham survived adoption of the Federal Rules, or
whether a statement that depends for value on the declarant's credibility
should be treated as hearsay even when offered to prove a matter other
than what the statement directly asserts."9 One can only speculate as to
why courts rarely explore the contours of implied assertions. It could be
the case that judges would rather not get lost "in this evidence teachers'
briar patch, and would rather spend energy on the great issues of the day.
Perhaps judges and lawyers trying to get good evidence past hearsay barri-
ers find it easier to go through one of the familiar exceptions than to navi-
gate the territory of implied assertions."'" It is apparent that scholars have
gotten a lot of mileage out of implied assertions, so it is useful to look back
and distill the issues surrounding this topic.
This essay will explore the historical treatment of implied assertions.
Part II provides an overview of the common law view of implied assertions
as embodied in Wright v. Tatham. Part III examines the treatment of im-
plied assertions in the Federal Rules of Evidence, while Part IV sheds light
on federal court outliers in reference to implied assertions. Part V high-
lights the treatment of implied assertions in the UK, Canada, and Australia
in order to provide international context and comparison. This essay will
conclude by explaining why the current state of the law in dealing with
implied assertions is at a high water mark that does not need to be
reversed.
II. IMPLIED ASSERTIONS IN WRIGHT V. TATHAM
At issue in Wright v. Tatham was whether John Marsden was compe-
tent to make a will.1 To prove his competency, Wright, who was the bene-
ficiary, presented letters that had been written to Marsden. 2 These letters
did not assert that Marsden was competent, but they did indicate that the
letter-writers believed him to be competent.' 3 As such, the triers-of-fact
had to decide whether or not this implied assertion was hearsay. In other
6. See Craig R. Callen, Hearsay and Informal Reasoning, 47 VAND. L. REV. 43 (1994); Michael
H. Graham, "Stickperson Hearsay": A Simplified Approach to Understanding the Rule Against Hearsay,
1982 U. ILL. L. REV. 887 (1982); Paul R. Rice, Should Unintended Implications of Speech be Considered
Nonhearsay? The Assertive/Nonassertive Distinctions Under Rule 801(a) of the Federal Rules of Evi-
dence, 65 TEMP. L. REV. 529 (1992).
7. 112 Eng. Rep. 488 (1837).
8. Park, supra note 2, at 802.
9. Id. (citing J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE I 801(a)[01], at 801-56
(1988)).
10. Id. at 803 n.84.
11. 112 Eng. Rep. at 488.
12. Id. at 490-91.
13. Id.
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words, "if one of the letters had said, 'Marsden, you are competent to make
a will,' it would clearly fall within the definition of hearsay as an out-of-
court assertion offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted, but that
was not the case."' 4 From the content of the letters, Wright wanted the
triers-of-fact to draw the inference that Marsden was indeed competent. 5
Wright did not prevail.' 6 The holding was well-summarized by Baron
Parke:
The conclusion at which I have arrived is, that proof of a
particular fact which is not of itself a matter in issue, but
which is relevant only as implying a statement or opinion of
a third person on the matter in issue, is inadmissible in all
cases where such a statement or opinion not on oath would
be of itself inadmissible; and, therefore, in this case the let-
ters which are offered only to prove the competence of the
testator, that is the truth of the implied statements therein
contained, were properly rejected, as the mere statement or
opinion of the writer would certainly have been
inadmissible. 7
In reaching this holding, the Exchequer Chamber used several exam-
ples to illustrate its points. Among these examples were (1) a person's
election to office as evidence of that person's sanity and (2) the conduct of
a captain inspecting a ship prior to boarding it with his family as evidence
of its seaworthiness.' According to the House of Lords, these two exam-
ples were equivalent to out-of-court statements by the voters and the cap-
tain.'9 Accordingly, the House of Lords ruled the letters inadmissible
hearsay."0 This position is rejected by the Federal Rules of Evidence.2 '
III. IMPLIED ASSERTIONS IN THE FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE
The definition of hearsay in Rule 801 of the Federal Rules of Evidence
has two primary components. First, a "statement" is defined as "(1) an oral
or written assertion or (2) nonverbal conduct of a person, if it is intended
by the person as an assertion."22 Second, "hearsay" is defined as "a state-
ment, other than one made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or
hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted. ' 23
This definition of hearsay "does not in terms say that everything not in-
cluded within the definition is not hearsay, but that was the intended effect
14. 2 MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 250, at 144 (Kenneth S. Broun et al. eds., 6th ed. 2006).
15. Wright, 112 Eng. Rep. at 516.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 516-17.
18. Id. at 516.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. See FED. R. EVID. 801(a); FED. R. EVID. 801(a) advisory committee's note.
22. FED. R. EVID. 801(a).
23. FED. R. EVID. 801(c).
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of the rule, according to the Advisory Committee's Note."24 In other
words, if a person's nonverbal conduct is not intended to be an assertion,
then it is excluded from the hearsay rule. The Advisory Committee's Note
states clearly that the "key to the definition is that nothing is an assertion
unless intended to be one."25
It must be remembered that "the hearsay rule is designed to guard
against ... imperfections of perception, memory, narration, and particular
sincerity. ' 26 The Advisory Committee's Note on Rule 801 explains that the
dangers listed above, which are inherent in hearsay,
are minimal in the absence of an intent to assert and do not
justify the loss of the evidence on hearsay grounds. No class
of evidence is free of the possibility of fabrication, but the
likelihood is less with nonverbal than with assertive verbal
conduct. The situations giving rise to the nonverbal conduct
are such as virtually to eliminate questions of sincerity.27
With this analysis, the Advisory Committee rejected "the view that
nonassertive nonverbal conduct, from which. . . produced the belief, is the
equivalent of an assertion that the event happened and hence hearsay. '28
The umbrella and stop light examples used above illustrate the point.
For example, "[p]rior to raising their umbrellas, people do not say to them-
selves in soliloquy form, 'It is raining,' nor does the motorist go forward on
the green light only after making an inward assertion, 'The light is
green.' "29 These two examples show that the "conduct offered in one in-
stance to prove it was raining and in the other that the light was green
involves no intent to communicate the fact sought to be proved, and pur-
poseful deception is much less likely in the absence of intent to
communicate. "30
At bottom, the federal drafters classified implied assertions as non-
hearsay because they believed that "if a person does not intend to make an
assertion, insincerity issues are significantly reduced or eliminated."'" Any
hearsay dangers that remain "should affect the weight accorded to the evi-
dence, not its admissibility. '32 In practice, this "rule is so worded as to
24. 2 MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 14, § 246, at 129 (citing FED. R. EVID. 801(a) advi-
sory committee's note).
25. FED. R. EVID. 801(a) advisory committee's note.
26. 2 MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 14, § 250, at 142.
27. FED. R. EVID. 801(a) advisory committee's note.
28. 2 MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 14, § 250, at 142.
29. Id.
30. Id. (citing Eustace Seligman, An Exception to the Hearsay Rule, 26 HARV. L. REV. 146, 148
(1912) ("[O]nly conduct apparently intended to convey thought can come under the ban of the hearsay
rule.")).
31. PAUL C. GIANNELLI, UNDERSTANDING EVIDENCE 444 (3d ed. 2009).
32. ROGER C. PARK ET AL., EVIDENCE LAW § 7.02, 266 (2d ed. 2004) (citing FED. R. EVID. 801
advisory committee's note).
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place the burden upon the party claiming that the intention existed; ambig-
uous and doubtful cases will be resolved against him and in favor of
admissibility.""
IV. IMPLIED ASSERTIONS: FEDERAL COURT OUTLIERS
A. Third Circuit Court of Appeals
U.S. v. Reynolds3 4 was a case involving two co-conspirators, Parran
and Reynolds, who were attempting to cash a stolen check." Prior to the
arrest of Reynolds, postal inspectors observed Parran speak to Reynolds
and then proceeded to walk down the street as Reynolds entered a nearby
bank.36 Reynolds attempted to cash the check, but the bank refused to do
so because he did not have an account there.37 Immediately thereafter,
Reynolds exited the bank and began looking in the direction of Parran.3 a
Reynolds then crossed the street and was arrested by postal inspectors for
possession of a check that was stolen from the mail.39 The postal inspectors
testified that after Reynolds was arrested, Parran approached him and
Reynolds addressed him saying, "I didn't tell them anything about you."
4 °
The trial judge allowed the statement to come in as evidence of Par-
ran's guilt of the crime charged.4' On appeal, the government argued that
Reynolds's statement "I didn't tell them anything about you" was admissi-
ble because it is was not offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted.42
The Third Circuit disagreed.43 In crafting the rationale behind its
holding, Judge Leon Higginbotham wrote:
As the government uses it, the statement's probative value
depends on the truth of an assumed fact it implies. Unless
the trier assumes that the statement implies that Reynolds
did not tell the postal inspectors that Parran was involved in
the conspiracy to defraud, even though Parran was in fact
involved, the statement carries no probative weight for the
government's case. For if the trier assumes that the state-
ment implied that Reynolds did not tell the postal inspec-
tors that Parran was involved because there was nothing to
tell, the statement has no relevance to the government's
case. Its only relevance to the government's case is tied to
33. FED. R. EvID. 801(a) advisory committee's note.
34. 715 F.2d 99 (3d Cir. 1983).






41. Id. at 100.
42. Id. at 102-03.
43. Id. at 104.
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an assumed fact of petitioner's guilt that the government ar-
gues the utterance proves.44
The court was clear in its assessment of implied assertions when it
stated: "statements containing express assertions may also contain implied
assertions qualifying as hearsay and susceptible to hearsay objections.
'45
Thus, the Third Circuit endorsed the Wright v. Tatham position 46 in defi-
ance of the Federal Rules of Evidence.47
B. Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals
Lyle v. Koehler4" was a case involving a joint murder trial of Lyle and
Kemp.49 While in jail, Kemp wrote two letters, which detailed the alibi he
wanted his friends to testify to.5° One letter instructed the recipient to say
that Kemp and Lyle were at the recipient's house when the murder took
place.51 Both letters instructed the recipient to testify that neither Kemp
nor Lyle knew the third suspect.52 The letters also instructed the recipients
to destroy the letters after the contents had been memorized so they would
not fall into the wrong hands.53 Kemp gave the letters to his sister so that
she could deliver them, but they were intercepted by law enforcement.
5 4
At trial, the prosecution offered the letters in evidence under the the-
ory that attempting to set up a false alibi implies guilt of the accused. In
other words, the prosecution claimed the letters were admissible because
they were not offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted.5 6 On
habeas petition to federal court, Lyle asserted a Confrontation Clause vio-
lation took place when the trial court judge allowed the letters in evi-
dence.57 In analyzing the issue, the Sixth Circuit assumed that if the letters
were not hearsay, no confrontation issue would be implicated.5 8 But the
court did determine the letters to be hearsay, adopting Morgan's 1948 view
of hearsay, stating that "[u]nder Morgan's view, the inference of Kemp's
guilty mind, as reflected in the letters, is not severable from Kemp's raw
statements; the letters accordingly present a hearsay problem."5 9 The court
44. Id. at 103 (citations omitted).
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. See FED. R. EVID. 801(a); FED. R. EVID. 801(a) advisory committee's note.
48. 720 F.2d 426 (6th Cir. 1983).
49. Id. at 429.
50. Id. at 429-31.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 430.
53. Id. at 430-31.
54. Id. at 429.
55. Id. at 432.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 431.
58. Id. at 431-33.
59. Id. at 433 (citation omitted).
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concluded that the use of the letters constituted hearsay, which was a viola-
tion of the right to confrontation. 60 Like the Third Circuit, the Sixth Cir-
cuit in this case crafted a holding that was in direct conflict with the
treatment of implied assertions in the Federal Rules of Evidence.6'
V. INTERNATIONAL APPROACHES TO IMPLIED ASSERTIONS
Apart from the interesting implications of implied assertions them-
selves is the interesting fact that treatment of implied assertions in the
United Kingdom, Canada, and Australia is similar to the treatment of im-
plied assertions under the Federal Rules of Evidence. The approach to
implied assertions in these countries will be examined in brief below in
order to provide context and comparison to the approach found in the Fed-
eral Rules of Evidence.
A. United Kingdom
In 2003, the United Kingdom's Parliament passed the Criminal Justice
Act 2003 (CJA) into law. Part 11 of the CJA "sets out to modernise [sic]
the hearsay rule, framing it in 'more positive and transparent terms' so as
to send 'a clear message that, subject to the necessary safeguards, relevant
evidence should be admitted where that is in the interests of justice.' "62
Among the reforms in the CJA was its treatment of implied assertions.63
The conundrum associated with implied assertions was brought to the
forefront in the United Kingdom in the case Regina v. Kearley.64 In
Kearley, the prosecution was attempting to prove that the defendant pos-
sessed the intent to sell the drugs found in his possession.65 To prove this,
the prosecution attempted to offer the contents of phone calls and "visits
made to Kearley's premises shortly after his arrest by an array of deter-
mined would-be customers, all asking to buy drugs. '6 6 All this evidence
was rejected as hearsay because it was classified as an out of court asser-
tion.67 Essentially, the holding in Kearley was the Wright v. Tatham ap-
proach of classifying implied assertions as hearsay.68
The CJA significantly changed the rule set out in Kearley. Section
115(3) of the CJA "provides that a matter is a 'matter stated' for purposes
of the hearsay rule only where the person making the statement appears to
the court to have had the purpose .. .of causing another to believe the
matter .... ",69 This rule embodied in the CJA tracks the Federal Rules of
60. Id.
61. See FED. R. EvIo. 801(a); FED. R. EVID. 801(a) advisory committee's note.
62. Di Birch, Hearsay: Same Old Story, Same Old Song?, 2004 CRIM. L. REV. 556, 556 (July
2004).
63. Id. at 564-66.
64. 2 App. Cas. 228 (H.L. Eng. 1992).
65. Birch, supra note 62, at 564.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. See supra Part II.
69. Birch, supra note 62, at 565.
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Evidence.7" In both bodies of law "nothing is an assertion unless intended
to be one,"'" therefore, unintended assertions or implied assertions are
classified as non-hearsay. Just as the Federal Rules of Evidence rejected
the Wright v. Tatham approach to implied assertions, so did the Criminal
Justice Act 2003.
B. Canada
In the early 1990's the Supreme Court of Canada affected sweeping
hearsay reform.7 2 At the heart of this reform was the "principled excep-
tion" to the hearsay rule.73 The principled exception is comprised of two
factors: necessity and reliability." This exception to the hearsay ruled has
provided Canadian courts "with a potentially broad discretion in assessing
admissibility on the facts of any particular case.""
While the principled exception was a sweeping reform to the hearsay
rule in Canada, on its face it did not confront the treatment of implied
assertions.76 In other words, while the Canadian Supreme Court's princi-
pled exception did not resolve "the definitional problem directly, it does
present a rational solution if implied assertions in conduct are defined as
hearsay because of the presence of hearsay dangers. ' 77 This is so because
the courts are free to make an exception to the hearsay rule if the necessity
and reliability factors are present.78 However, even though the Canadian
Supreme Court did not classify implied assertions as non-hearsay, in prac-
tice "Canadian courts have tended to admit such evidence on the ground
that it is not hearsay. ' 79 Either way, the notion of admitting implied asser-
tions in evidence has been given great latitude in Canada.
C. Australia
Australian law concerning implied assertions reached a turning point
beginning in 1989, when courts began excluding implied assertions from the
hearsay rule.8 ° Implied assertions were also described in other terms such
as "original circumstantial evidence not tendered for the truth of its con-
tents"81 or "inherently reliable utterances. ' 82 Regardless of the terminol-
ogy, Australian courts were content with classifying implied assertions as
70. See FED. R. EVID. 801(a); FED. R. EVID. 801(a) advisory committee's note.
71. FED. R. EVID. 801(a) advisory committee's note.
72. Bruce P. Archibald, The Canadian Hearsay Revolution: Is Half a Loaf Better Than No Loaf
at All?, 25 QUEEN'S L.J. 1, 4 (1999).
73. See id. at 26.
74. Id. at 26.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 14.
77. Id. at 16.
78. Id. at 15-16.
79. Id. at 15 (citing R. v. Fialkow, [1963] 2 C.C.C. 42 (Ont. C.A.)).
80. Marian K. Brown, Reform and Proposed Reform of Hearsay Law in Australia, New Zealand,
Hong Kong, and Canada, with Special Regard to Prior Inconsistent Statements, 2007 ANN. CONF. OF THE
INT'L SOC'Y FOR THE REFORM OF CRIM. L. 8, http://www.isrcl.org/Papers/2007/Brown.pdf.
81. Id.
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non-hearsay.83 The trend resulted in "[l]engthy studies by the Australian
Law Reform Commission [that] resulted ... in the 1995 Commonwealth
Evidence Act (Evidence Act), governing the federal courts and the courts
of the Territories."84 The Evidence Act, like the Federal Rules of Evi-
dence, codified the hearsay rule, while excluding implied assertions from
the hearsay definition." Section 59(1) of the Evidence Act states, in perti-
nent part, "[e]vidence of a previous representation made by a person is not
admissible to prove the existence of a fact that the person intended to as-
sert by the representation."86 This definition rejects the Wright v. Tathem
approach to implied assertions and closely tracks the hearsay definition in
the Federal Rules of Evidence. 7
Broadly speaking, the United States, the United Kingdom, Canada,
and Australia stand shoulder to shoulder in their rejection of Wright v.
Tathem and their acceptance of implied assertions as reliable evidence.
VI. CONCLUSION
The hearsay rule is designed to keep imperfections of perception,
memory, narration, and sincerity away from the trier of fact.88 If one were
to take an uncompromising stance in guarding against these hearsay dan-
gers, one would have to take a different stance than that which has
emerged in contemporary law. An uncompromising stance would mean
that hearsay would encompass
(1) all conduct of a person, verbal or nonverbal, intended by
him to operate as an assertion when offered either to prove
the truth of the matter asserted or to prove that the asserter
believed that matter asserted to be true, and (2) all conduct
of a person, verbal or nonverbal, not intended by him to
operate as an assertion, when offered either to prove both
his state of mind and external event or condition which
caused him to have that state of mind, or to prove that his
state of mind was truly reflected by that conduct.
89
But defining hearsay in this manner, which is a definition of hearsay
expanded "to the outer limits suggested by logic and analysis," 9° is undesir-
able because it introduces "needless complication [which] outweigh[s] any
supposed advantage." 91 In this same vein, the contemporary treatment of
82. Id.
83. Id. at 8-9.
84. Id. at 8.
85. Id. at 8-9.
86. Commonwealth Evidence Act § 59(1) (1995).
87. See FED. R. EVID. 801(a); FED. R. EVID. 801(a) advisory committee's note.
88. See 2 McCoRMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 14, § 250, at 142.
89. Edmund M. Morgan, Hearsay and Non-Hearsay, 48 HARV. L. REV. 1138, 1144 (1935).
90. 2 MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 14, § 250, at 146.
91. Id.
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implied assertions as outside the reach of the hearsay rule "reflects ulti-
mately a compromise between theory and the need for a relatively simple
and workable definition in situations where hearsay dangers are generally
reduced."92
But the contemporary view of implied assertions has not just made
sense in theory; it has proven itself in practice. A look at the
"case law does not reveal any obvious signs of injustice.
There are no anguished judicial cries for change, or com-
plaints about being bound by an inflexible code that only
Congress can change. . . . Courts applying the definition
seem to have accomplished good results in almost every
published case."
9 3
Moreover, a look at the case law reinforces the theory behind the con-
temporary approach to implied assertions. The cases in which implied as-
sertions are involved "generally involve utterances classed as non-hearsay
that raise no real insincerity dangers affecting the purpose for which they
are being used."94 For instance, "[t]he persons who made the intercepted
calls to bookmakers are very unlikely to have been consciously plotting to
incriminate the bookmakers."9 5
The contemporary approach to implied assertions as embodied in the
Federal Rules of Evidence and also in the laws of the United Kingdom,
Canada, and Australia has proven itself to be sound. This approach, which
treats implied assertions as non-hearsay or a hearsay exception, has cut
through the thicket of the hearsay rule and emerged battered by hearsay
scholars, but vindicated in practice.
92. Id.
93. Park, supra note 2, at 836.
94. Id. at 836-37.
95. Id. at 837.
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